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FINANCING IMPLICATIONS OF MINERAL DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: SOME NOTES ON RECENT 
MINERAL AGREEMENTS IN SOUTH AMERICA 
I) Introduction: The impact of the legal regime for financing mineral 
development 
The legal regime governing mineral development projects is of essential 
importance for the financing arrangement, i.e. the negotiation, the structure 
and finally the implementation of the financing mechanism for a mining 
project. The legal regime for a mining investment determines primarily the 
amount of funds that are available from the project's future cash flow to 
repay loans, share profits between the partners, allow repatriation of 
depreciation, dividends and capital to project sponsors. Thereby, it defines 
the distribution of income between the project's investors(sponsors), 
financiers and the government. For example, the government's share will in all 
likelihood consist of income taxes, tempered by extensive accelerated 
depreciation/amortization rules, of additional profits taxes based on income 
exceeding a specified internal rate of return, on levies on the value of 
production( royalties; export taxes*, minerals levies etc.), on taxes on 
dividends distributed and on income shared on the basis of free, carried or 
fully paid-up government equity in a project. Production-sharing is another 
feature influencing the amount of cash flow available, and in fact resembles, 
if calculated as a fixed percentage, a royalty. 
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In addition, the legal regime of a mining project will contain provisions that 
are essential for a lender(and an investor) who have a vital concern to obtain 
a return(based on interest or based on profit) from the financing provided. 
For example, there will be provisions concerning the availability of foreign 
exchange to service debt and allow repatriation up to a certain level of 
dividends; there will be provisions regulating the foreign exchange component 
of sales proceeds, with priority for debt service and in some agreements there 
is a special foreign trust account set up to receive sales proceeds, in 
particular from long-term sales contracts vital for mine financing*, the 
amounts held in the account are administered by a trustee in accordance with 
contractual instructions and distributed acording to the guidelines set up, in 
general with priority to servicing debt, followed by paying out to the 
investor/sponsor what is due to him under the relevant contracts.( Suratgar, 
1982; Stockmayer and Suratgar, in: UN/DSE, 1982; Mc Cormick, 1983; Stockmayer, 
forthcoming 1984) 
Provisions in mining contracts sometimes address quite specifically questions 
of financing. For example, contracts may stipulate that a certain debt/equity 
ratio not be exceeded(e.g. 75:25), that payments received by project investors 
as interests on shareholder loans are considered as taxable income if a 
specified debt/equity ratio is exceeded. Contracts often distribute 
responsibility for financing, mainly on the mining project operator and impose 
general obligations on him, such as to seek financing at competitive terms. 
Shareholder loans are an important part of the financing package and they may 
be tied to long-term purchase commitments and repaid out of proceeds from 
long-term purchase contracts. Clearly, shareholder loans have to be 
scrutinized carefully so as to avoid channeling away of untaxed profits. The 
credit exposure of both government, project investors/sponsors and 
participating state enterprises has become an important issue for 
negotiations, where the obligation to provide loan guarantees for expenditures 
envisaged, but in particularly for cost overruns and unexpected shortfall of 
revenues required for debt service has to be distributed between government,, 
state enterprises and project sponsors.(Cf. Stewart Mc Gill, 1983) 
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As home country taxation may affect the cash flow available, contracts 
frequently provide for an obligation of both partners to promote the 
conclusion of a favorable double-taxation treaty or to adapt the agreement in 
case of a change in the home country's tax rules so as to allow the project 
sponsor to obtain maximum tax credit at home without detriment to the host 
state. 
Quite apart from contractual or regulatory provisions addressed directly to 
financing, the legal regime of a mining project is of great concern to 
lenders, as its provisions, the management and control structure, the 
financial system and the legal status established thereby will be decisive for 
the investment project's ability to perform satisfactorily and thereby to 
repay loans and provide return on investment. While some clauses in the 
agreement, i.e. the provisions stabilizing the fiscal regime constituted 
against subsequent legislation or the provisions setting up a procedure of 
arbitration to settle disputes affect the stability of the agreement directly, 
other stipulations, i.e. renegotiation clauses, the system of joint ownership 
, of management and control established, are decisive for the ability of the 
project to perform. Lenders tend for these reasons increasingly to scrutinize 
not only the provisions of an agreement directly relevant for the availability 
of funds for repayment of loans, but also the overall character, status, 
fairness and flexibility of a mineral development agreement. Their interest 
will be served best if the agreement, generally envisaged to govern relations 
for several decades, is likely to stand the test of time and change. Contracts 
that may look very beneficial to investors achieved at a time of low 
bargaining power, skill, information and experience of government may in the 
longer run be counterproductive and be likely to provoke pressures for change, 
renegotiated or unilaterally imposed, that may be perilous to the fine fabric 
of a complex arrangements coordinating interests and performances by 
investors, financing institutions, long-term purchasers and government. 
The legal regime of a mining project consists , depending on the legal 
tradition in a specific developing country, of legislative and regulatory 
(3886N) 
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elements on one side and contractual elements on the other side. For example, 
the country's mining, investment, tax, company, customs, foreign exchange, 
labor and environmental law may provide the legislative and regulatory 
framework, and they may often provide rules that are directly applicable(i.e. 
income tax law; duration of mining titles; mines safety regulations), while 
contractual elements may specify the applicability of general legal 
principles, adjust the general legal regime to the specific requirements of 
the project at issue and reflect the long and strenuous bargaining process to 
achieve an agreement on the distribution of revenues, of risks, of ownership, 
capital contributions and management powers between the participants. On the 
side of the contracts, one can find an investment contract- between the 
government and the investor governing the grant of investment incentives, a 
mining agreement with the Ministry of Mines determining the applicability of 
the mining law, the content , scope and duration of mining titles, but also 
obligations concerning environmental protection, economic development and 
several components of the project's fiscal regime. If the state enterprise 
plays an important role, often major issues of control, management, ownership, 
marketing, revenue-sharing and risk-capital are addressed in a specific 
agreement with the state mining enterprise. More recently, as state 
enterprises have become project sponsors themselves, the foreign investor's 
role is transformed to contractor(or contractor/joint venture investor) 
supplying management, technical assistance and financing to the state 
enterprise. Financing arrangements are sometimes handled exclusively in 
agreeements between sponsors/investors and lenders, but often a network of 
agreements involving project sponsors, state enterprise, government 
authorities(i.e. Mining Ministry, Central Bank; Ministry of Finance), 
multilateral and bilateral public financing institutions, export financing 
agencies and long-term purchasers of projected mineral output is necessary(cf. 
Suratgar, Stockmayer? Mc Gill). 
In the following, recent developments in mining and investment legislation and 
mining agreements will be discussed and three specific agreements of 
considerable interest - in Colombia, Chile and Guyana - will be analysed in 
more detail. 
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II) Recent Developments in Mining/Investment Legislation and Mineral 
Development Contracts 
The period from 1965-1980 was characterized by events reflecting a strong 
assertion of permanent sovereignty over natural resources by developing 
countries, by large-scale nationalizations of minerals extraction, by 
renegotiation of existing arrangements, by the coming into being of state 
enterprises and by numerous commodities producer associations. The 1980s seem 
to highlight problems of investment, i.e. the successful combination of 
capital, technology and managerial capacity, and the problems of declining 
demand, both necessary to transform reserves into working projects generating 
benefits for national economic development. The recession in developed market 
economies, leading to the present crisis of the world's mining industry, does 
not facilitate this task. Persistent low prices, high inflation rates and 
high investment costs result in low profit margins or operating losses; 
ability and willingness to invest in exploration and mine development are 
substantially curtailed. The situation of projects in developing countries is 
particularly aggravated. Very high costs for new projects, in particular for 
substantial infrastructural facilities and political risk perception on the 
side of companies and financing institutions make it very difficult to develop 
new projects. Most large-scale mining projects developed in the seventies 
have not fulfilled the financial expectations of governments, investors and 
lenders, and several (e.g. Selebi Phikwe in Botswana, EXMIBAL in Guatemala) 
have resulted in large losses and in continuous debt restructuring. Many 
large-scale projects have been scaled down or abandoned altogether (e.g. Tenke 
Fungurume in Zaire). Competition between many potentially economic deposits 
increases substantially the time between discovery of most deposits and their 
commercial development. New investment takes place mostly in the case of 
high-grade, smaller-scale projects or in projects with significant by-products 
(e.g. gold), in projects without substantial infrastructural requirements and 
generally in countries benefitting from favourable risk assessment or in 
projects benefitting from public subsidy (e.g. the Sohar copper project in 
Oman). Closures of existing mines and processing facilities are frequent. 
( 3 8 8 6 N ) 
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It is not surprising that the large financial resources necessary for 
project development are very difficult to obtain. The high debt burden of 
most producer countries and the frequency of present debt rescheduling has 
made public and commercial financing institutions more wary to commit funds to 
risky mining projects, with ever less assurance of later sales at the price 
necessary to repay loans. Project financing , the solution of the end-1970s, 
is getting more difficult, as at present few new projects promise on their own 
strength sufficient returns for adequate repayment and risk coverage; if 
project financing is possible, it is undertaken on the strictest terms, both 
for countries and investors, and tough completion guarantees are attached, 
acting as an additional investment deterrent. New projects almost always 
include extensive supplier credits and non-commercial concessional public 
finance. 
Companies which have traditionally been willing to invest their.own risk 
capital have turned to carrying out exploration on a service-contract basis, 
particularly in petroleum producer countries. Countries intent on having 
discovered deposits developed are finding that companies ready to sell their 
services or equipment (management, technical assistance, turnkey projects) 
abound, but that it is exceedingly difficult to get these suppliers to commit 
themselves by taking a substantial equity stake in the project. The 
substitution of equity financing by external loans in the 1970s continues and 
external financing requires guarantees that not all countries and state 
enterprises are able, or considered capable, of providing. 
Oil companies, considered a new and promising source of financing at the 
end of the 70s, are more wary about investment in non-fuel minerals, as the 
large-scale entry of the oil majors has so far produced only losses (for 
example, EXXON Minerals has so far incurred losses of over US$500 million). 
Oil-producing countries were also expected to become heavily involved in hard 
minerals; however, they had to reduce their role as real oil income is falling 
short of optimistic projections. The comparably high prices in some years in 
the past and concerns over security of supply have stimulated large flows of 
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private and public funds into mineral exploration and mine development; as a 
result, there is oversupply in most minerals (bauxite, nickel, uranium, iron 
ore, copper and others) and new projects compete with each other for financing 
funds and purchase commitments. 
The choices for Governments desirous of developing national resources are 
difficult. They can choose to postpone mineral development, except for 
minerals needed for domestic consumption, until a more propitious situation 
should come about. They can also adopt the strategy of establishing a 
vigorous state sector, financed by public funds which could be the main 
vehicle for phased development of a national mining industry. This is the way 
which has been chosen, for example, by India and it might be available to 
countries with large indigenous technological, managerial and financial 
resources and a domestic market of sufficient size. Governments may also 
choose the policy of energetically encouraging investment. In that case, it 
is essential to prepare the groundwork for improved government policies, 
expressed in mineral development and investment legislation and in 
agreements, in a number of countries, legal instruments for mineral 
development do not yet achieve the optimum possible, i.e. attraction of 
investment, fairness of terms and a significant contribution to national 
economic development. Accordingly, there is room for considerable improvement 
which could become most effective if and when the macro-economic outlook for 
the world's mining industries improves. The many instances of mineral 
investment by developing countries in other developing countries recently or 
by centrally planned economies (cf infra) may portend more substantial 
involvement in the future. 
Legislation addressing investment, in particular foreign investment, has 
been a characteristic feature of the last decade. In the early 70s, 
investment legislation was predominantly directed to screening, monitoring and 
restricting foreign investment? more recently, and in particular at present, 
the emphasis ¡seems, on observing world-wide trends, to have shifted from 
restriction to, albeit selective and controlled, promotion and encouragement. 
This trend reflects changed economic conditionss investment, particularly in 
( 3 8 8 6 N ) 
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natural resources, has slowed down substantially; also, in a number of 
countries, new policies are a response to experience with parastatals gained 
subsequent to nationalization. 
Mining legislation is the method used by Governments to regulate mining 
activities proper. 'Traditionally, the main function of mining laws focused on 
the relationship between mining and land ownership and on state regulation of 
mining activities. The mining law governed the issue, the administration and 
the cancellation of mining titles; it organized government agencies and their 
supervisory powers; and it covered settlement of disputes between competing 
claims. Over the last decade, new mining laws have been enacted in many 
developing countries and are being updated. The policies underlying recent 
mining legislation is reflective of the priorities and national strategies 
pursued by the respective Government. A common denominator seems in many 
instances to have been the need perceived to replace pre-independence 
legislation. Another feature of many mining laws in the late 60s and- early 
70s has been to express an emphasis on the state sector, though this emphasis 
has been less pronounced in recent years, as illustrated in the greater 
emphasis on private investment. 
In the case of large-scale projects, contract negotiations between the 
Government and the prospective investor are usual. While legal systems 
influenced by French law regulate investment agreements (convention 
d'etablissment) in some detail, countries influenced by British law tend to 
negotiate ad hoc agreements, sometimes embodied in "special licences". 
Experience has shown that it might be preferable for both partners if the 
authority and the procedure for negotiating and concluding agreements with 
investors, including the scope of such agreements, were clearly spelled out in 
the mining law. Also, the bargaining position of a Government is clearly 
enhanced if its laws provide a clear framework, a set of policy objectives and 
legal predictability for individual project contracts. Lastly, one can 
observe a trend towards standardizing mechanisms negotiated in contracts which 
have proved useful, either by incorporating them into model agreements or into 
generally applicable legislation. This development strengthens the hand of 
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Governments and reduces the often very heavy burden on government resources 
required by detailed and protracted negotiations. Also, the issue of mining 
rights is increasingly being separated from agreements, the function of which 
is to formulate in more detail additional obligations and rights pertaining to 
the investment. 
Some writers have portrayed the developments of the last decade as an 
advance from "concession" to "joint venture" to "service" (technical 
assistance/management) agreements, implying that the foreign investor at first 
admits host state participation (joint venture) and finally renders services 
as a subordinate "contractor" to the state mining enterprise. It is true that 
some state enterprises have acquired full ownership and concluded service 
agreements in petroleum and in a few cases in non-fuel minerals. A 
comparative analysis of the various types of agreement has found that, from a 
financial viewpoint, the form of the agreement is of little importance and 
that states often may have even lost revenues through the innovative 
arrangements advocated in the 1970s. Some countries have come to the-
conclusion that the emphasis on extensive ownership has led to a drain on 
their revenues, and, pushed by their treasuries, they are at present looking 
for ways to re-attract private capital to assume the risk of mineral 
investment. Also, countries have discovered that effective control over 
mining investment can be achieved by suitable economic and administrative 
policies and institutions in a less costly and risky way than by full-fledged 
government ownership. One solution practised has been to have the investor 
manage the operations under a symbolic supervision and require him to organize 
financing and assume the risk, but to arrange this de facto investment under 
the label of a service contract. 
The present attitude of companies must seem paradoxical to anyone who 
regards the movement towards service contracts as a movement towards greater 
host state control: Companies in recent projects often clearly prefer to act 
as suppliers of services and equipment, as managers of the project and 
eventually as long-term purchasers of output, but have been unwilling to 
contribute risk capital, of their own. 
(3886N) 
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Obligations of the company to gradually relinquish exclusive exploration 
areas, to carry out mutually agreed-upon work programmes and to undertake 
minimum expenditures, to post performance bonds, to serve earliest notice of 
discovery and finally to submit an adequate feasibility study are by now 
standard contract clauses and are being transferred into the general mining 
law. One issue is often debated in negotiations: Under what conditions must 
the company, after discovery, either develop the deposit or abandon its mining 
rights? Governments naturally want discovered deposits to be developed as 
soon as possible, while companies prefer to make a decision based on their own 
mine development, financing, marketing and mineral reserves policy. Modern 
agreements often provide for a review of the feasibility study by independent 
experts. Should the conclusion be reached that the deposit can be developed 
on a commercial basis (i.e. produce the rate of return usual in the industry), 
then the position of a company which is unwilling to develop the deposit 
weakens. Either it must develop the mine or lose its mining titles or be 
obliged to transfer all or part of its rights to another company which is 
willing to assume the investment. Sometimes, a waiting period (eventually 
combined with a waiting fee calculated as a royalty on possible production) 
allows the company to hold on to the mining right for a longer period. If the 
mining rights are transferred to another company which is willing to invest, 
compensation is often granted to the discoverer. Such compensation can be on 
the basis of previous exploration expenditures (eventually adjusted by an 
inflation or interest index), on the basis of a share in the operating 
company, on the basis of a production royalty or a combined mechanism. 
Modern contracts (concession, joint venture or service contracts) take 
account of the fact that ownership does not automatically confer control and 
that the function of management can be separated from ownership. While 
government equity is frequent, sometimes exceeds 50% or even reaches (in the 
case of service contracts) 100%, management is often entrusted to the foreign 
partner. This organizational set-up seems to be a reflection of the fact that 
mining companies and international financing institutions are unwilling to 
contribute capital if they are not assured that an experienced mining company 
will be in charge of operations. Banks, in particular, insist on strict 
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completion guarantees from experienced operators. Far-reaching management 
powers can be embodied in separate management agreements, in the conditions of 
a "contract of work" (e.g. the 1981 Indonesian contracts), in the articles of 
association of joint venture companies or in the organizational set-up of 
contractual joint ventures and service agreements. The real role of Government 
becomes clear in the degree of supervision exercised over management. 
Sometimes joint technical committees are set up (in cases of non-corporate 
joint ventures) to consult, to supervise, sometimes to make policy decisions 
and to approve major issues submitted by management. In cases of corporate 
joint ventures, the board of directors has the potential of becoming an 
effective decision-making organ. Requirements of unanimity make the question 
of which party has majority largely theoretical. The real weight of such 
representation in supervisory or decision-making organs depends on the 
commitment and ability of government representatives and on the procedures of 
decision-making. While some Governments delegate political appointees, others 
delegate technical experts or at least provide for a technical group-to advise 
board members. 
Fiscal Regimes for Mineral Development 
In considering and in negotiating the various fiscal instruments, it is 
useful to view them as components of a single package, irrespective of their 
name, whether they are named taxes, export duties, royalties or free equity. 
The employment of the methods of negotiation and financial analysis enable 
negotiators to evaluate the impact and the interplay of the various fiscal 
levies. In some countries with no previous exposure to the mining industry, 
considerable efforts are necessary to co-ordinate the state agencies concerned 
- the Ministry of Mines, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank and others 
- to allow the formulation of a consistent and comprehensive government policy. 
Royalties, as a value-based charge on mineral production have not 
disappeared, as has often been predicted. They provide stabilized revenue, 
are a minimum charge for depletion of non-renewable resources and constitute 
in some mining countries the main source of revenue. Some countries have found 
that extensive royalty-like payments independent of profitability (export 
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taxes, sales taxes, artificial exchange rates) can erode the company's ability 
to reinvest and to maintain productivity. Also, development of marginal mines 
may be made uneconomical and high-grading may be encouraged. Mining of 
low-grade ores can upon determination by Governments, be subject to 
substantial royalty discounts; such discounts are also granted if operating 
expenses plus royalties exceed a specified amount. Governments following a 
policy of active investment promotion have granted royalty discounts for the 
initial years (to increase early cash flow, of considerable impact on 
discounted cash flow analysis) of commercial production and have recognized 
royalties in these years as payment towards future income taxes, thus reducing 
the tax burden, while retaining a stable source of income. 
Government participation in the form of equity has a considerable impact 
on rate-of-return calculations, in particular if the Government obtains equity 
free or at the time of mine development at its option on preferential terms 
("carried interest"). The apparent financial benefit of a large free-equity 
percentage is often eroded in reality. Equity is never really "free" as it 
always requires a trade-off. In some cases this is arranged by keeping the 
original capital of the operating company small and raising the necessary 
capital either by cash contributions or by debt guarantees from all 
shareholders, including the Government. In other cases free equity is granted 
in exchange for mining rights, but provision is made for full reimbursement of 
the investor for previous exploration expenditures. A higher share of free 
government equity is regularly compensated for by a lower share of other 
levies, e.g. income taxes. In cases where the investor can obtain home 
country tax credit for income taxes paid, the host state will lose if it 
reduces taxes to compensate for higher free equity. 
Additional profits taxes (windfall taxes, resource rent taxes), triggered 
by income in excess of a stipulated rate of return, are frequently encountered 
in modern mining taxation and mining agreements. The common principle 
underlying the many complex formulas is that income exceeding a reasonable 
rate of return will be subject to additional government participation. This 
mechanism allows for considerable flexibility, as marginal and average 
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operations are not affected by prohibitive taxes, while in cases of highly 
profitable operations the state obtains an additional share, without having to 
request renegotiation of the agreement. The tax is, in general, triggered by 
a specified rate of return on total investment, not on equity investment. In 
practice, the investor's return can accordingly be much higher, depending on 
the debt/equity ratio, before it is subjected to the tax. However, this 
mechanism takes into account the investor's risk exposure by loan and 
completion guarantees and the provision by financing institutions for fast 
repayment of loans before the tax can start to operate. While this 
sophisticated system probably has the advantage of providing for greater 
flexibility and for reducing investment risks, it is also rather complex to 
handle. It may, hence, work best as an additional mechanism complementing a 
fully developed mining tax system. 
An indication of the impact of an unstable economic environment is the 
spread of indexation and other adaptation mechanisms. Cost control is 
important for host state administrations because companies have a natural 
interest in representing untaxed profits as cost reimbursements, in particular 
through affiliate transactions. As agreements with state enterprises rely 
increasingly on cost/plus reimbursement formulas, the more important cost 
control becomes. The standard procedure is to subject affiliate transactions 
to close scrutiny and measure them against the yardstick of market prices or 
at-arm's-length prices, where this is feasible. Another mechanism has been to 
disallow certain overhead expenses incurred abroad, or at least to set 
percentage limits on general overhead. 
Depletion allowances have been criticized in the last decade, but are 
still used in francophone African countries and have reappeared in Peru 
(1981). Some Governments favour the Canadian system of earned depletion 
allowances: companies are allowed to set aside a share of annual production 
value or profits (e.g. 10% of production or 25% of profits) or a percentage of 
exploration expenditures (Guyana Rl982n: 10% for five years, 5% thereafter) 
to be used for exploration. If within five years this exploration reserve 
fund is not used, full income taxes would apply, eventually on the 
(3886N) 
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interest-adjusted reserve fund. 
Tax credit by the home country for taxes paid by the mining company to 
the developing country can become a major issue, in particular in the case of 
U.S.-based companies. Royalties and government participation generally do not 
qualify for tax credit; some Governments have therefore been able to obtain 
higher financial revenues from mineral development by trading equity for 
higher income tax shares. In particular, the formulation of additional 
profits taxes is often geared to obtaining tax credit in the home country, for 
example by imposing the tax on pre-tax income (which requires a considerably 
higher rate of return-to-trigger the tax). 
Tax stabilization clauses formerly restricted the Government's right to 
enact new taxes; their validity was questionable as they were meant to 
restrict national legislative sovereignty. Modern clauses are more subtle: 
they make the project fully subject to national law (including tax law), but 
provide that new fiscal levies affecting the financial equilibrium are to be 
compensated by a corresponding reduction of existing levies. 
The emergence of state enterprises is posing new problems for state tax 
policies. Many Governments which have nationalized petroleum and minerals 
production have seen their revenues decrease considerably and some have had to 
provide considerable financial support to keep state enterprises in operation 
(Indonesia, 1972-1975; Colombia, 1965-1975; Bolivia, 1951-1972; Ghana, from 
1960; Mexico, 1982). As a result, many countries have started to require 
state enterprises to make payments to the treasury, sometimes through 
dividends to the state as a shareholder, sometimes by way of consolidation 
with the national income administered by the treasury. Some state enterprises 
are subject to the full range of taxes (Malaysia, Pakistan, non-fuel mining 
enterprises in Indonesia). In general, however, state enterprises enjoy 
privileged tax treatment on the theory that they are supposed to pursue wider 
objectives than merely profit maximization and therefore require corresponding 
tax compensation. Tax treatment of state mining enterprises is still an 
unexplored field, and both the actual amount of revenue obtained and the tax 
policies pursued require extensive study. 
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IV) DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND RENEGOTIATION 
Nationalizations, frequent in the late 60s and early 70s, have been 
relatively rare as of late. In some recent cases, companies have left of 
their own volition, e.g. some U.S. petroleum companies in Libya. As many 
projects are incurring losses at present, a certain interest by parent 
companies in having the projects nationalized by the Government against 
compensation can be noted. While the issue of nationalization under 
international law is still being disputed, actual practice - as contrasted to 
legal claims - has relied predominantly on net book value, sometimes inflation 
adjusted. Payment is in practice generally made in hard currency, but often 
deferred, as in the case of government-guaranteed US$ bonds. A characteristic 
feature of many compensation settlements is the continued presence of the 
nationalized investor, albeit in the role of a contractor supplying 
management, services and purchasing output. Such composite settlements often 
contain an additional element of compensation in the formulas used to 
calculate management, shipping and marketing fees. 
Renegotiation of existing agreements constitutes a more subtle and 
flexible way to adapt a relationship to change. While in times of bargaining 
strength host countries have resorted to this method of contract adaptation, 
companies also rely on this instrument if technical or economic circumstances 
seems to require a revision of existing agreements. 
A substantial renegotiation of existing long-term agreements is a 
reflection of fundamental changes in the economic environment affecting the 
equilibrium of an agreement. For example, the unexpected price increase of 
uranium in the 70s has resulted in renegotiation of most long-term, 
fixed-price sales agreements, with litigation over the issue of whether a 
multiplication of the uranium price constitutes "commercial impracticality" 
and hence a legitimate reason for 
renegotiation. Long-term contracts for the supply of bauxite, copper and iron ore 
between Australia and Japan have been renegotiated, affecting both the price and 
(3886N) 
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the quantity of mine output to be delivered to Japan. Price renegotiation has also 
taken place in natural gas agreements; producer countries are relying on the price 
explosion in petroleum to justify a corresponding increase of natural gas prices. 
At present, due to energy price increases, a number of government-owned power 
enterprises locked into long-term, fixed-price contracts concluded in the 60s with 
aluminium smelters are requesting increases in power supply rates. Renegotiation 
is also an issue on the agenda if a pricing mechanism - for example, in long-term 
minerals sales contracts - are based on indexes the evolution of which no longer 
has any relationship to the cost structure of mining operations. 
When requesting renegotiation, Governments and enterprises rely on the legal 
principles of rebus sic stantibus (fundamental change in basic circumstances of a 
contract justifies a revision), while the defending party will insist on the 
"sanctity of contract". Also, investors will often point to "stabilization 
commitments" to protect the contract from adaptation. While the legal assessment 
- of such arguments is difficult, actual practice demonstrates that renegotiation is 
a natural accommodation of partners in long-term business relations. Contractual 
practice in mineral development agreements, in long-term commodity contracts and in 
financing agreements has resulted in the formulation of ever more sophisticated 
mechanisms of periodic review, of automatic escalation and adaptation.of 
contractual parameters in response to changing environmental conditions and 
external (cost, price, inflation) indexes. 
Arbitration is the prevalent mode to settle disputes which inevitably arise. 
Its function is, firstly, to motivate the parties to reach an agreement among 
themselves in order to avoid the intervention of third parties, and, secondly, to 
provide a neutral forum for settling disputes. Major petroleum producers have 
successfully insisted on the jurisdiction of their national courts. Similar 
policies are adhered to in most Latin American countries. In other developing 
countries, arbitration, either under the auspices of the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) or the World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) is the rule. The United Nations General Assembly (in 
resolutions 31/198 of 1976 and 35/52 of 1980) recommended the use of the 
Arbitration and Conciliation rules of the United Nations Commission for 
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International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). While ICC and ICSID provide an institutional 
setting, UNCITRAL rules provide only procedural rules; it is up to the parties to 
agree on an authority to appoint the decisive third arbitrator in the event that 
the two arbitrators appointed by each side cannot reach an agreement. Some recent 
agreements provide an appointing authority for national or regional institutes or 
for institutions supposedly more familiar with developing countries. As recent 
arbitral proceedings demonstrate, this choice often determines the outcome of 
arbitration. 
The main recent cases of international arbitration dealing with the 1972 
nationalization of petroleum companies in Libya and with the Jamaican production 
levy have been discussed. The Libyan cases have led to awards requiring 
restitution and compensation from Libya. Efforts to enforce these awards by 
seizing Libyan assets have failed in Switzerland, but were successful with American 
courts which held that Libya, by submitting to arbitration, had waived its 
sovereign immunity. 
A recent arbitral award concerns a dispute between Kuwait and AMINOIL over the 
nationalization of a petroleum concession with a duration up to the year 2020. The 
arbitral tribunal recognized Kuwait's right to nationalize, subject to 
compensation, it held that even a stabilization clause could not prevent Kuwait 
from exercizing its right to nationalization. In coming to that conclusion it 
relied on the theory expounded previously that the stabilization clause is but one 
of the many factors to be taken into account and balanced when the arbitrators are 
called upon to determine the compensation payable for legislative intervention into 
vested contractual rights. In determining the compensation payable, the 
arbitrators also held that it is the specific circumstances of the case, and not 
abstract general principles,which should govern the question of compensation 
payable. In particular, they relied on the concept that investors should at least 
be able to earn a reasonable rate of return on their investment. Instead of book 
value they used the depreciated replacement value(which takes into account 
inflation) and adjusted this value by a reasonable rate of return assumed to be 
17.5% per annum up to the date of the arbitral award(i.e. not up to the date(2010) 
when the concession originally was to terminate. The award, as compared to previous 
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arbitral awards, distinguishes itself by a less rigid and more flexible approach, 
allowing the various factors raised in the international law debate to be 
recognized within a context of balancing based on the specific characteristics of 
. the case at issue. 
V) Three Recent Mineral Developments Agreements in South America 
A) Background 
Foreign investment has been a prominent and probably the major factor in bringing 
about the substantial mining industries of Chile, Peru, Bolivia(though here 
national entrepreneurs played a major role), Venezuela, Brasil and Guyana. On the 
other hand, economic nationalism and sentiment against foreign domination of vital 
national industries grew in the 1960ies, based on earlier antecedents and most 
major mining projects were transferred into state ownership, operated through state 
mining enterpr ises (CODELCO; MINERO-PERU/CENTROMIN> COMIBOL, since 195-2» 
Hierro-PERUj GUY-BAU/BIDCO:....) from 1969-1975. New investment during that time 
was not actively encouraged and was subject to the relatively restrictive 
conditions of the investment regulations of the Andean-Pact(in particular Decision 
24), grouping Chile(at that time), Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombia. 
The idea that emerged during that time was that mineral resources were to be 
developed exclusively by national(public or private) enterprises and that essential 
foreign inputs had to be acquired "depackaged", i.e. as separate purchases of 
equipment and technical assistance services. The mining laws of that period -
notably the 1970 General Mining Law of Peru, fell in line with this emphasis on 
natinal mining investment. 
This situation has been evolving, starting from 1975 and picking up considerable 
speed as a consequence of the worldwide economic recession 1980-1982 which has hit 
in particular the mining industries. Many projects that were considered viable in 
1970 were not developed, as was expected originally, by the new state enterprises, 
due to the lack of capital, managerial and technical abilities, problems with 
marketing and more recently by the impact of the recession and the consequent 
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long-term decline of metal prices. Governments have realized the difficulty of 
getting investment organized, be it through national or through foreign 
enterprises and that trade-offs between national control and active mineral 
development have to be faced. The evolution of governmental policies can be 
traced on the legislative scenet The 1981 Peruvian mining law, the 1982 mining 
law of Uruguay, the 1979/1980 mineral promotion laws of Argentina witness the 
gradual shifting of emphasis from restriction to promotion. The investment 
rules of the Andean Pact have been softened progressively through national 
regulation and are more or less irrelevant today to mining investment. 
Nationalizations or forced-upon renegotiations have not occurred in the last 
years and countries have gone great lengths - without too much success - to 
re-attract foreign investment, albeit on terms that have to accomodate the 
political sensitivities of the South American countries and the practical 
requirements of investors and financiers. Three contracts have been selected 
which reflect this accomodation between government and investor/financier in 
three South American countries, where mineral production plays, or is- expected 
to play, a major role for the national economy. These contracts , as a rule, 
are accompanied by other agreements influenced by the model set; they reflect 
on one hand the particular situation, the attitudes and traditions of the 
individual countries, but also mark the shift in mineral investment policies 
that has taken place. 
(1)Chile/ St. Joe Minerals of 1977 (El Indio) 
The 1977 investment agreement between Chile and St. Joe Minerals is marked by 
the very dramatic historical relationship between Chile and foreign mining 
investors. In the history of Chile, one of the world's major copper producers, 
mining, in particular copper, has played a major role. Large scale copper 
mining was initiated and developed by US companies(in particular Kennecott and 
Anaconda), and the nationalization of Kennecott and Anaconda under the Allende 
government in July 1971 was a major event, both in internal Chilean politics 
and within the context of the wave of nationalizations concerning foreign-held 
mining and petroleum operations around that time(Cf. Theodore Moran, Copper in 
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Chile, 1974).The following military government maintained the new Chilean 
state mining companies(CODELCO and ENAMI), but it attempted to accelerate 
mineral development - the stronghold of the Chilean economy and its major 
foreign exchange and export earner - by promoting foreign private investment, 
thus reversing the nationalistic policies followed by the Allende, but also 
the preceding Frei government. 
The new policy by the military government is expressed in Decreto-Ley No. 600 
of 1974 which governs foreign investment in Chile. Decreto-Ley 600 has 
been(since 1977 modified) the legal instrument of paramount importance for 
regulation of investment in mining, in particular as up to the new mining law 
of 1982 there was no modern mining legislation governing the grant of mining 
concessions in Chile and as Chile has not concluded specific "mining 
agreements". The system used in Chile, under Decreto-Ley 600, was a "foreign 
investment agreement", negotiated with the Foreign Investment Committee, that 
govern the grant of a series of investment incentives and guarantees"to the 
foreign investor. This approach is different from comparable investment 
legislation of the time - notably Decision 24 of the Andean Pact - that 
emphasize not incentives, but restrictions and obligations imposed on foreign 
investment(and it is not surprising that Chile left the Andean Pact shortly 
after passing its 1974 Foreign Investment Law). It is also different from 
mineral development/investment agreements, that generally combine obligations 
and performance requirements, including special mining taxes, with guarantees 
and some tax incentives. The Chilean investment law appears, on the other 
hand, rather similar to the investment laws and investment agreements that 
have been passed in a number of French-speaking African countries("Convention 
d'etablissement). In principle, the law authorizes the government to grant to 
foreign investors a large number of guarantees , tax and related exemptions? 
these are embodied in the form of an "agreement"(instead of a simple 
administrative grant, probably to increase the expectation of stability). Most 
agreements concluded at the same period differ relatively little from each 
other. The 1974 investment law was not viewed uncritically by all members of 
the ruling group in Chile, in particularly insofar as it contained an element 
of discrimination in favor of foreign investors through the grant of rights 
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that were unavailable to national investors. Some of the most-far reaching 
privileges(e.g. the 30 years stabilization guarantee) were reduced in the 1977 
modification of the law(Deereto-Ley 1748). 
The main features of the Chilean foreign investment laws, to become operative 
through specific foreign investment agreements, ares 
- maximum tax guarantees 
- guarantees against future restrictions on repatriation of profits, 
capi tal,compensa t ion 
- accelerated depreciation 
- loss carry-forward provisions 
- foreign exchange privileges 
In addition, the military government split up the operative and regulatory 
role of CODELCO and created(Deereto-Ley 135o) CODELCO as the state enterprise 
in charge of production and marketing of copper on one hand and the Gomision 
Chilena del Cobre(Decreto-Ley 1349 of 1976) to advise the government on copper 
policies and to regulate and supervise copper production companies on the 
other.(Cf. Carlos Fortin, The Copper Policy of the Pinochet Government) 
Since 1975, Chile has concluded, under the 1974 foreign investment law, a 
number of agreements. In 1975, an agreement with Metallgesellschaft(reprinted 
in Vol. I, at p. 467 et. seq.) started the foreign investment in Chile's 
mineral resources("Toqui"). In 1977, agreements were concluded with Noranda(a 
51/49% joint venture between Noranda and the Chilean state enterprise ENAMI to 
develop the Andacollo copper deposit), with Superior Oil/Falconbridge/Mclntyre 
Mines (a 51/49% joint venture with the state enterprise CODELCO to develop the 
Quebrada Blanca copper deposit), with Poote Minerals( a Newmont Mining 
subsidiary), a 55/45% joint venture with the state development corporation 
CORFO to develop lithium in the Atacama desert, with Nippon Mining (to develop 
the Cerro Colorado copper deposit) and finally with Compania Minera San Jose, 
Inc. , a 100% controlled subsidiary of St Joe Minerals to develop the El Indio 
gold/copper deposit. In 1978, EXXON Minerals purchased the La Disputada copper 
mine from the state enterprise ENAMI and concluded a foreign investment 
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agreement; in 1979, ANACONDA concluded a foreign investment agreements for 
exploration and development of the Los Pelambres deposits. In 1982, Getty Oil 
and Utah International have signed an agreement authorising investment in 
copper mining up to 1.5 billion US (La Escondida copper deposit). 
As of 1983, Noranda had withdrawn from the Andacollo project, due to financing 
difficulties and was reimbursed for exploration expenditures. Nippon Mining 
abandoned the Cerro Colorado deposit. Metallgesellschaft withdrew from the 
Toqui project. The lithium project is going forward. EXXON has continued to 
invest in exploration. Anaconda has stopped work in Los Pelambres due to the 
high cost of the project. While under given low copper prices the commercial 
viability and therefore the development of these copper 
projects is not clear, the El Indio project operated by St Joe Minerals is 
the only major successful case of mineral foreign investment in Chile, indeed 
it has been reported that among the major mining projects initiated in the 
197oies the El Indio mine was the only one that showed a good rate of. return 
performance(Mikesell, Foreign Investment in Mining Projects, p. 23o et. seq.). 
The El Indio deposit is located at about 4.ooo m above sea level in the 
Chilean Andes. The deposit contains gold, silver and copper. It was exploited 
for decades on a small scale, until, in 1974 it attracted the attention of St 
Joe Minerals. St Joe purchased mining rights from private owners through 
Compania Minera San Jose; San Jose now owns 80.6% of El Indio, the rest 
belongs to private Chilean owners. Intensive exploration started in September 
1976 and again in September 1977 , after the investment agreement was signed 
in 1977. By 1978, the orebody had been delineated, with two kinds of ores: 
Direct shipping ores, 49.222 MT, with 345 gr/MT of gold, 145 gr/MT of silver 
and 2.6o% of copper; and ores to be processed in the plant, 3.12o, 616 MT, 
with 12 gr/MT of gold, 144 gr/MT silver, and 3.52% copper. In late 1978, the 
decision to develop the mine was taken. In late 1981, the first commercial 
shipments started. Operations for 1982 yielded sales of ca. 12.ooo kg of gold, 
19.9oo kg of silver and 9.700 MT of copper. St Joe has reportedly spent over 
214 million $ in developing the deposit.(Cf. Mikesell,1983, 234 and Mining 
Magazine, March 1982; Denis Acheson, Revista Mensaje, September 1983)). 
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(2) Colombia/EXXON Association Contract for Block B of Cerrejon Coal 
Project(1976) 
After extensive, and ultimately fruitless, discussions between the Government 
and Peabody International to develop the coal deposit of Cerrejon, Block A-
(Central Cerrejon), covering about 38.000 ha, the government granted in 1976 
the mining rights to the state petroleum company(ECOPETROL). ECOPETROL put up 
the project for international bidding on the basis of a Contrato de 
Asociacion. EXXON was selected and established INTERCOR as its project sub-
sidiary. The mining rights were subsequently transferred to CARBOCOL, a newly 
established state enterprise for coal development. After the conclusion of the 
agreement in 1976, intensive exploration took place resulting, in 1980, in the 
declaration of a commercial discovery. The investment decision was taken sub-
sequently. By 1981, project development had started(e.g. roads, airstrip, -
railway, port facilities, social-economic impact study). Total investment was 
estimated, in 1979, to reach more than US $ 1.2 billion and is likely to be 
substantially higher. Commercial production is expected to start in 1984/1985, 
and to last for at least 23 years with annual production of 15 million tons. 
The project is one of the major coal development projects worldwide and the 
largest investment project in Colombia. 
The legal framework for the mining activities in Colombia is constituted by 
the Mining Law No. 6o of 1967 and No. 20 of 1969 as amended by Decree No. 1275 
of 1970 and Colombia's petroleum code. CARBOCOL obtained its mining rights 
under these l^ws. The investment agreement, embodied in the Contract of 
Association, required approval under applicable investment regulations(Cf. the 
authorization of the investment of August 12, 1976 reprinted as an annex to 
the agreement). Foreign exchange privileges(in particular the right to trans-
fer proceeds obtained for the sale of INTERCOR's assets and INTERCOR's net 
profits) are granted under Resolution 23 of December 16 of 1976 of Colombia's 
National Council of Economic and Social Policy, C0NPES(Cf. Annex). 
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(3) Guyana/COGEMA Uranium Development Agreement(1982) 
Guyana, a South-American and at the same time Caribbean country, is an 
important producer of bauxite. Bauxite operations were taken over from 
1972-1974 from foreign investors and have since been run by Guyanese state 
comp nies(GUY-BAU/BIDCO). In recent years, due to technical, financial and 
managerial problems, but also due to the economic recession and the erosion of 
Guyana's strong position as a producer of calcined bauxite, production and 
revenues has fallen considerably and foreign assistance has been sought to 
improve the performance of Guyanese bauxite mining operations. Apart from 
bauxite, there is a lively activity of small- and middle-scale miners 
extracting gold, mostly by dredging operations from placer deposits. Most of 
the gold is smuggled out, to avoid having to sell it to government authorities 
for overvalued Guyanese currency. Guyana has been trying for some years to 
diversify its mineral production by encouraging gold, manganese, petcoleum and 
uranium development, primarily by foreign companies. As there are indications 
for interesting uranium deposits, talks were held around 1980 with 
Uranerzbergbau, a F.R. German uranium company which brought no result, due to 
different conceptions about revenue-sharing. In 1979, a non-exclusive 
prospecting license was granted to COGEMA, a subsidiary of CEA, the French 
government's nuclear power agency, for uranium prospection. Under the terms of 
the agreement relating to the prospecting license, COGEMA was entitled to 
prospect for 3 years for uranium; it could then apply for an exclusive 
exploration right under a contract to be negotiated. The prospecting agreement 
was rather ambiguous and it was not clear, what type of agreement was 
envisaged and what would happen in case of disagreement on the terms of such 
agreement. 
Negotiations between Guyana(with the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the 
Guyana Geology and Mines Commission) continued through 1981 and 1982 and led 
to an agreement in February 1982. Both sides were pressed to accomodation: The 
Guyana government was anxious to obtain foreign investment and to demonstrate 
its acceptance by foreign mining companies; in addition, the exploration of 
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uranium was to be conducted in an area of Guyana that is claimed by Venezuela. 
Getting French state involvement was hence seen as an asset in Guyana's 
dispute with Venezuela. COGEMA, on the other hand, was interested to diversify 
its sources of supply of uranium for France's very energetic and far-reaching 
nuclear power programme, up to now mainly dependent on Gabon, Niger and 
Namibia. Subsidized by government, it was involved in a major strategy to open 
up new sources of supply, resulting in COGEMA exploration or participation in 
Zambia, Colombia, Australia, Indonesia, Canada and other countries. 
Guyana was assisted by the United Nations and a consultant from the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and a recent uranium agreement with Tanzania with 
Uranerzbergbau played the role of setting an example. Subsequently, though the 
uranium price was falling dramatically and most forecasts predicted 
considerably oversupply for the future, COGEMA has been continuing exploration 
and spent about 2o million US $( as of 1984) on the basis of the agreement. 
The agreement is based on the Guyana mining law (of British origin) and 
applicable tax legislation, but, as compared to Colombia and Chile, the 
Guyanese bargaining team had much more leeway to negotiate and was less 
constrained by applicable mining, investment, company, customs or tax 
regulations. The smaller size of Guyana and a tradition of British law might 
be factors that have encouraged such comparative flexibility. 
B) Type of Contract 
Different from the Colombian and Guyanese agreement, the 1977 Chile/St. Joe 
contract is an "investment agreement" exclusively between the state acting 
through its Investment Commission and St. Joe as investor applying for 
investment incentives and guarantees under the applicable investment 
legislation. Most issues otherwise regulated in mineral development 
agreements(joint venture; revenue-sharing, including special taxes, royalties, 
fees etc) between governments and state enterprises on one hand and foreign 
investors on the other hand are absent. This method reflects the Chilean 
policy of not imposing on foreign investors joint ventures with CODELCO, the 
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state mining enterprise and using the investment law primarily as a device to 
attract investment in non-CODELCO projects(often, as here, with private 
Chilean partners) by the issue of incentives and guarantees. While other 
issues are notably absent, the incentives and gua-antees granted are ample, 
detailed and comprehensive, thus reflecting the concerns of investors over a 
repetition of the nationalizations under the previous government and methods 
by the new Chilean government to provide assurances against such anxieties. 
The main issues of the negotiation with San Jose(and the other agreements, 
which are very similar) were the question of tax stabilization, de-
preciation/amortization rates, import duty exemptions, foreign exchange 
privileges, non-interference by government in marketing and production,other 
tax exemptions, debt/equity ratios, and arbitration issues. A major issue were 
the scope of foreign exchange privileges. The history of foreign investment in 
Latin America is fraught with difficulties under foreign exchange 
restrictions: Countries usually, particularly in times of foreign exchange 
crises, tend to appropriate all foreign exchange proceeds from mining 
projects, while foreign investors tend, naturally, to be able to retain 
foreign exchange proceeds to service debt, to repatriate profits and to 
protect the investment against nationalisation. In addition, exchange rates 
with an artificially high value for domestic currency were sometimes imposed 
resulting in the imposition of quasi-taxes on foreign investment. The foreign 
exchange privileges of the agreement have to be seen in light of such 
experiences. In particular, St. Joe may retain export proceeds abroad, open 
foreign currency accounts in Chile and have free access to foreign exchange 
for carrying out the investment. These privileges are meant to ensure that the 
investor may effectively service its debt and obtain profits in foreign 
exchange. 
Another important issue was the exemption from taxes and the limitation for 
new taxes. Again, these guarantees and incentives were borne out of the 
experience of investors with new taxes and other quasi-fiscal levies (e.g. the 
Jamaican bauxite levy imposed in 1974) that disrupt the financial system 
agreed or assumed during the time of the investment decision. Renegotiation of 
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fiscal arrangements and imposition of new taxes, levies and other additional 
government participations of a fiscal character are a prominent feature of 
government/investor relationships in the 1970ies and St Joe and the other, 
companies were insisting on getting as many and as comprehensive guarantees 
from Chile as was possible. Accordingly, the government promises that it will 
not levy taxes on the sale of assets by St Joe,pdssibly in reference to the 
Allende-government's claim for taxes on "excessive profits" to be deducted 
from compensation payable after the nationalisation of Kennecott and Anaconda 
in 1971. The essential promise relates to a maximum tax burden of 49.5% on 
earned income(Art. 4.16). Given that Chile does not use production-based 
royalties or similar levies(production levy? export taxes etc.) and combined 
with the promise of Chile not to impose any new taxes or comparable fiscal 
levies(Art. 4.17), this promise (including the corporate income, the dividend 
withholding and a housing tax) effectively restricts government taxation to 
ca. 5o% of taxable income. In contrast, most other mineral producers(including 
Canada, Australia and South Africa) use, in addition to a general income tax, 
dividends withholding taxes and property taxes also production-based 
royalties(in copper between 1 and 5 % of the value of metal contained in ore) 
and recently a special mining taxes on additional(windfall/excessive) profits 
exceeding a stipulated rate of return on investment. The Chilean method of 
avoiding additional special mining taxes and of subjecting mining investment 
only to the generally applicable income taxes is certainly an incentive of 
considerable power. It is probably based on the philosophy prevailing in Chile 
at that time favoring effective incentives for an aggressive investment 
promotion policy. 
The financial impact of these fiscal incentives is bolstered by accelerated 
depreciation of fixed assets and by a 5-year amortization of preproduction 
expenses. These provisions are frequent in modern mining agreements and some 
agreements concluded under the impact of double-digit inflation even adjust 
preproduction expenses by reference to an inflation or cost-of-capital 
index(E.g. the 1982 Guyana/COGEMA uranium contract). A five-years loss 
carry-forward(Art. 4.12) ensures that the provisions for accelerated de-
preciation/amortization will exercize the required impact on the investor's 
cash flow calculations. 
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Other fiscal exemptions relate to interest paid on foreign loansj this 
provision is aimed at attempts in some countries to levy a tax on foreign 
loans which make financing and financing charges a more substantial burden 
both for the investor artd for the income-collecting tax authorities. St Joe 
is also granted an exemption from import duties, provided products of 
comparable quality are not available at comparable terms in Chile. 
A salient feature of the agreement is the freezing of income tax and customs 
duty rates for the term of the agreement, i.e. for 30 years(Art. 4.16 and 
4.24) and the guarantee that no additional taxes will be imposed in the 
future, except if St Joe opts for a subsequent, generally applicable tax 
system out of its own volition. This freezing clause(authorized by the 1974 
act and reduced under the 1977 act to 10-years) is not very frequent, as it 
seems to tie down the state's sovereign power of taxation for an inordinately 
long period. Few countries would go sofar as to oblige themselves and the 
following governments for such a long period» in a number of countries (e.g. 
Jamaica), courts have held that a government can not tie the hands of the 
following governments and arguments are raised to the effect that any 
provision to that effect is counter to the basic tenets of sovereignty and in 
contradiction to the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural re-
sources. In fact, the recent arbitral award in Kuweit v. AMINOIL(Int'l Legal 
Materials, 51(1982) 976) attributes only a relative effect to a contractual 
stabilization clause and a previous award (LIAMCQ v. Libya, Revue de 
1'Arbitrage, 1981, 132) recognizes the state's right to abrogate such 
stabilization clauses by nationalization with compensation. A close reading of 
the agreement, however, reveals that Chile may have reserved its right to 
abrogate "the guarantees given, albeit under the condition of compensation for 
damages, as Art. 4.26 of the agreement provides for "payment of full and 
adequate compensation for any injury or damage to San Jose caused directly or 
indirectly thereby"(i.e. if the guarantees under the agreement are impaired, 
attenuated or abrogated). Presumably, Chile would not be able under inter-
national law to abrogate these provisions for compensation, even if it may be 
entitled to abrogate the guarantees mentioned above. 
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Another guarantee of considerable importance relates to the freedom of the 
investor to determine production and marketing policies, without interference 
from the government. Again, this clause(which is frequent in African 
"conventions d'etablissement") is borne out of the experience of mining 
companies with governments that impose minimum production targets, even in 
times of unprofitable operations(to maintain foreign exchange earnings or to 
maintain mining employment) and that require producing companies to sell below 
market prices to domestic consumers or in the framework of intergovernmental 
arrangements. In addition, St Joe's position is furthermore bolstered by the 
provision(another stabilization clause) that St Joe "shall have the right to 
sell and export subject to such laws and regulations as are in effect at the 
date of this Agreement". This provision recognizes the supervisory powers of 
the Comision Chilena del Cobre based on applicable law in 1977(e.g. its right 
to check if sales to affiliated enterprises conform to world market 
conditions, cf. also Art. 4.15(a) and (b) of the agreement and Decreto-Ley 
1349, Art. 18 concerning a state monopoly for sales, also Law No. 16.624, Art. 
7,8 and 9 concerning mandatory reserves for domestic consumption and the Rules 
of the Board of the Chilean Copper Commission on the Chilean Producer Price, 
fixed by the Board for the time being as the IME higher grade for copper)), 
but exempts St Joe from subsequent, and more intensive government 
intervention, such as for example the imposition of OPEC-style "posted prices". 
The 1976 Colombia/EXXON Cerrejon coal agreement is a "Contract of 
Association".The Contrato de Asociacion has been used by ECOPETROL since 1959 
for larger operations with foreign investors in petroleum. Up to 1980, 62 
contracts of that type were signed. The contract of association constitutes 
basically a non-corporate joint venture whereby the Colombian state enterprise 
holds the mining right, the foreign partner assumes the risk of exploration 
and whereby both partners share both in project development expenditures and 
project revenues. It differs both from the form of the equity joint venture, 
used in Colombia for the 1970 Cerro Matoso nickel agreement and from 
operations contracts used by ECOMINAS to participate in smaller mining 
operations, prin- cipally concerning emeralds, managed and financed by private 
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mining companies.(Operations contracts basically mean that the state 
enterprises leases the area, viz. the mining rights, against financial 
participation based on the prospective, or , if ascertainable, real value of 
production) Other major projects(e.g. the Cerrejón Block A coal deposit) are 
operated directly by CARBOCOL on the basis of service and turnkey contracts 
with engineering companies. 
The 1982 Guyana/Cogema uranium contract provides that in the event of 
commercial discovery and development a joint stock company will be set up. 
Different from Chile, where there is no state participation in the El Indio 
project, both Colombia and Guyana use a joint venture model. While the 
Colombian joint venture is a mere contractual joint venture, without any 
reliance on the models of company law, Guyana uses the joint stock company to 
constitute the form of cooperation. Both in Guyana and Colombia, as will be 
seen, the foreign partner assumes the role of the manager, with supervision 
and policy-making delegated to joint organs of cooperation. Thus, the. system 
of a separate management contract( as in the 1976/1980 Panama Cerro Colorado 
agreements) is integrated into the organisatio of the joint venture itself. 
C) Organisation, Management and Control 
While, true to its nature as a investment agreement, the Chile/St.Joe contract 
leaves corporate organisation to the private companies forming a joint 
venture,both Colombia and Guyana have established a delicate structure of 
management by the foreign company, while supervision and policy-making rests 
with a joint organs. Carefully inserted checks and balanced bring about the 
necessary compromise between the government's interest in control, 
participation and eventual full national control, and the companies°and 
investors"requirement of full management during the exploration and an 
extended part of the production phase. 
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In the Colombian case, the "Operator", i.e. INTERCOR, will be set up as an 
independent company and undertake construction according to a pre-established 
and agreed upon work programme. Expenses will be charged to a joint account. 
Three years are allotted for the construction period, with possibilities for 
an extension. The exploitation period starts with the first shipment of coal 
to seagoing vessels and lasts until the end of the contract's term(30 years). 
The parties have emphasized(Art. 31) that it is not envisaged to set up a 
jointly owned corporation or a partnership. Parties have no power of attorney 
for each other and no joint liability exists. However, contrary to such 
denials of corporate joint-ventureship, the 50/50 % participation in a joint, 
high-risk and long-term coal development project requires a quasi-corporate 
organization to allow the partners to achieve the necessary coordination and 
institutionalization of their community of interest. It is therefore in-
teresting to observe how INTERCOR and CARBOCOL have constructed a non-
corporate institutional network for joint project cooperation. 
INTERCOR is to set a company as the "Operator" , designated as the prime 
holder of management responsibilities and entitled to appoint the "Manager" of 
the joint project. The appointment of the "Manager" will require previous 
consultations with CARBOCOL. Operations will be subject to an "Executive 
Committee". The task of this committee will be to supervise construction and 
operations; evaluate the Operator's performance, approve work, investment and 
expenditure programmes; approve expenditures and contracts of a large scale, 
appoint auditors and supervise the management of the Joint Account. The 
Executive Committee consists of representatives of CARBOCOL and INTERCOR in 
equal number. Its decision require unanimity. It is to meet four to five times 
a year and is empowered to establish sub-committees. The executive committe 
hence appears as the main body for organizing project cooperation. In case the 
unanimity rule prevents a decision, recourse will be had to the chief 
executives of both partners and eventually the contract's machinery for 
dispute settlement is to break a deadlock. This three-tiered process of 
decision-making may become rather heavy, but it can be expected that the ex-
pectation of long and protracted negotiations will motivate the partners on 
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the Executive Committee to seek a solution themselves, thereby avoiding the 
escalation to high-level consultations and ultimately arbitration and 
litigation. 
The Executive Committee supervises the Operator; the Operator is free to 
appoint personnel, but has to comply with general guidelines of the Executive 
Commi ttee. 
The Joint Account is .the main instrument to organize the financial re-
lationship between the parties. The Joint Account is, according to the 
agreement, to be set up if commercially exploitable deposits are discovered. 
This provision reflects the risk-character of the agreement: The foreign 
partner is to bear the exploration risk, a full partnership with a sharing^ of 
costs, benefits and risks only takes effect, if the exploration resulted in 
commercially exploitable deposits.Through the joint account Colombia fully 
participates, if not in the exploration risk, in the risk related to the 
development of the mine and the marketing of the output. Also, it has to 
secure financing and thereby fully assume the risks of financing, e.g". 
increasing interests rates in spite of a possible shortfall in revenues and 
cost overruns. The Joint Account is characterized by the 50/50% distribution 
of expenses and benefits. All expenses are to be charged to the Joint Account. 
If a party is in default with respect to its mandatory contribution to the 
Joint Account the other party will receive interest at commercial rates on its 
positive position in the account. As expenses will be incurred in Colombian 
pesos and US dollars, special rules are provided for currency conversion. If 
CARBOCOL is in default with its obligations to contribute, INTERCOR can use 
its royalty payment obligations to cover the default and equalize the joint 
account positions of both parties. 
In Guyana, the government's position is characterized by its inability, now 
and in the future, to contribute risk capital to uranium development. Guyana 
has been for quite some time in dire difficulties concerning availability of 
foreign exchange and is unlikely to find commercial financing. On the other 
hand, given its history of nationalizations and its professed state and 
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cooperative socialism, it was anxious to occupy the commanding heights of the 
mining venture. The compromise resulting is rather unique: Guyana obtains a 
25% free equity in the project,-protected also in case of capital increases 
and against any obligation to secure shareholders* loan guarantees. In 
addition, Guyana will nominate the majority on the board of directors, 
including the chairman, of the prospective joint operating company, 
irrespective of its 25% equity share. Finally, Guyana retains an option to 
acquire up to 51% , either when the joint operating company is set up at a 
price reflecting COGEMA*s paid-up capital, or, if subsequently, at commercial 
rates assessed by independent valuers. 
In exchange, COGEMA insisted that it retain full management powers and be 
protected by unanimity rules on the board of directors in all questions 
concerning major decisions. Additional checks and balances consist of a 
"Guyanization" of the positions of Chief Financial Controller, 5 years after 
commissioning of the mill, and General Manager, lo years after commissioning 
of the mill? other control devices are a joint marketing committee to monitor 
marketing, in particular long-term sales contracts, a dispute-settlement 
method to determine in case of pricing disputes and elaborate rules on 
allowable expenditures. The Guyana contract is rather unique in the respect 
that COGEMA accepted Guyanese majority irrespective of Guyanese free or 
paid-up equity, but can be workable on the basis of the extensive management 
powers and unanimity requirements for COGEMA. 
D) Financial Regime 
In the Chle/St. Joe agreement, fiscal instruments are not so much established 
as incorporated from general tax legislation and frozen(cf. supra). The 
promise relates to a maximum tax burden of 49.5% on earned income(Art. 4.16). 
Given that Chile does not use production-based royalties or similar 
levies(production levy; export taxes etc.) and combined with the promise of 
Chile not to impose any new taxes or comparable fiscal levies(Art. 4.17), this 
promise (including the corporate income, the dividend withholding and a 
( 3 8 8 6 N ) 
- 34 -
housing tax) effectively restricts government taxation to ca. 5o% of taxable 
income. In contrast, most other mineral producers(including Canada, Australia 
and South Africa) use, in addition to a general income tax, dividends 
withholding taxes and property taxes also production-based royalties(in copper 
between 1 and 5 % of the value of metal contained in ore) and recently a 
special mining taxes on additional(windfall/excessive) profits exceeding a 
stipulated rate of return on investment. The Chilean method of avoiding 
additional special mining taxes and of subjecting mining investment only to 
the generally applicable income taxes is certainly an incentive of 
considerable power. It is probably based on the philosophy prevailing in Chile 
at that time favoring effective incentives for an aggressive investment 
promotion policy. 
The financial impact of these fiscal incentives is bolstered by accelerated 
depreciation of fixed assets and by a 5-year amortization of preproduction 
expenses. These provisions are frequent in modern mining agreements and some 
agreements concluded under the impact of double-digit inflation even adjust 
preproduction expenses by reference to an inflation or cost-of-capital 
index(E.g. the 1982 Guyana/COGEMA uranium contract). A five-years loss 
carry-forward(Art. 4.12) ensures that the provisions for accelerated de-
preciation/amortization will exercize the required impact on the investor's 
cash flow calculations. 
In the Colombia/EXXON agreement, the fiscal regime has to be seen in light of 
the fact that CARBOCOL, the Colombian state enterprise, assumes 50% of project 
development expenditures, and thereby a heavy, and rather unusual financing 
burden for a state mining enterprise. The revenues of the Colombian state are 
generated by fiscal instruments and by the participation due to CARBOCOL as 
partner of the Association Contract. The Colombian state receives income 
primarily through regular income taxes(at 52%). A recent analysis(Stephen 
Zorn, Coal and Uranium Investment Agreements, Natural Resources Forum 6(1982) 
at p„ 350) is based on the assumption that, apart from "participation 
revenue"(Cf. infra) no income taxes are due; this reading of the contract 
ignores that Art. 16.4 and 3o of the agreement are based on the assumption 
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that regular income tax is paid under generally applicable income tax law. As 
the contract regulates only the INTERCOR /CARBOCOL cooperation, and as it does 
not constitute a modification, or waiver, of generally applicable legislation, 
the fact that the contract itself does not provide details on general income 
tax can in no way be used to assume that income tax is not payable. In 
Colombia, as in other countries with a strong legal tradition, the government 
can not waive or modify the applicability of general legislation except if 
expressly authorized by law to do so. This reading is confirmed by an analysis 
of the contract by the Colombian National Planning Department(1981, op.cit., 
at 2.2.1). 
The second method of generating government income is through the three-tier 
revenue-sharing system between INTERCOR and CARBOCOL as partners of the con-
tractual joint ventures CARBOCOL receives (1) royalties; (2) a share of the 
coal produced? (3) participation revenue, i.e. a kind of an additional tax on 
profits exceeding a basic rate of return on investment(Art. 13 et. seq.). 
_Coal production is shared between both partners at the rate of 5o/5oT In 
addition, INTERCOR has to provide to CARBOCOL a 15% royalty on its share. A 
part of the royalty is to go to provincial and municipal authorities under 
Colombian law. CARBOCOL may take the royalty either in cash or in kind. In 
both cases, the royalty is calculated on the mine-mouth value or volume, with 
transportation and storage charges for delivery to the export terminals to be 
accounted for separately. 
A very interesting fiscal instrument is the "participation revenue" due to 
CARBOCOL. Basically, INTERCOR income(not including US ^-indexed depreciation) 
exceeding a rate of return of 35% on accumulated total investment is subject 
to the tax/participation mechanism at rates that rise progressively in pro-
portion to the absolute amount of pre-tax(but after-royalty) income exceeding 
the 35% rate-of-return level(Cf. Art. 16.2 and Exhibit I, para .3). This 
mechanism has to be seen in the light of the fact that INTERCOR registered all 
of its capital contribution as equity investment so that there wiil be no de-
duction of interest on INTERCOR's capital contribution when calculating income 
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subject to taxation and the participation mechanism. An evaluation of the 
financial terms conducted for the Colombian National Planning Department(para. 
2.2.1) comes to the conclusion that the participation mechanism , in terms of 
net present value, has a financial impact equivalent to additional royalties 
at a rate,, depending on the prices for thermal coal, between 2 and 7%. While 
agreeing in principle with the participation mechanism, the financial 
evaluation regards the threshold of a 35% rate of return for imposing the 
additional tax for excessively high,' particularly when compared to an average 
rate of return of ca. 15% earned by US mining companies on equity investment. 
While a 35% threshold is indeed unusually high, one should not forget that, 
different from additional profit taxes imposed elsewhere (e.g. Guyana? 
Tanzania; Papua New Guinea), the Colombian participation mechanism is imposed 
on a total investment figure that is not adjusted by reference to an inflation 
index; hence, as inflation increases the nominal value of revenues, but not 
the nominal value of the investment base, the 35% target will be easier to 
reach. Also, the fact that INTERCOR does not deduct interest when calculating 
its revenues for tax purposes, increases revenues and hence makes it easier to 
reach the 35% threshold. Finally, while financial experts always emphasize 
that additional profits taxes should be calculated by using a rate of return 
on equity and not on total investment, it is very difficult to find in actual 
practice any contract or mineral tax regulation using that theoretical 
approach . 
When considered as a whole, the financial regime of the contract based on a 
57.5/42.5(royalty already being taken into account) production-sharing, a 52% 
income tax and the participation mechanism imposed on pre-tax profits is more 
favorable than is claimed by commentators. When compared to more recent coal 
contracts (e.g. the 1981 agreements between Indonesia and US coal companies) 
with lower royalties, lower income taxes and without an additional profits 
tax, Colombia appears not to have made such a bad deal after all. Such 
evaluation holds true even if the fact is taken into account that 
Colombia(effected through the Joint Account, Art. 21) has to contribute 5o% of 
the expenses for developing and operating the coal deposit; the investor has 
to assume exploration at his own risk(Art. 5) and is apparently not reimbursed 
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for exploration and other pre-production expenses(as is often done in 
exploration/development agreements) except by amortization of such 
pre-production expenditures to reduce the income-tax load. On the other hand, 
by sharing expenditures and production, CARBOCOL is certainly more heavily in-
volved both in the commercial and technical risk - and the benefits - of the 
Cerrejon project than Indonesia in 1981, where the government's role is re-
stricted to taxation without participation in the venture with its own risk 
capital. 
the Guyana/COGEMA agreement, the financial arrangements and the fiscal 
regime are based on the philosophy that Guyana should not be exposed to any 
foreign-exchange liabilities and that the fiscal regime should be flexible to 
the ups and downs of the volatile uranium market. Guyana obtains a 25% free 
equity, protected against increase of capital and requisite shareholders 
guarantees or loans. Guyana is only obliged to provide advances through goods, 
services and products or Cash in Guyana currenc. A debt/equity ratio-of 4:1 (in 
Chiles 85s15) is agreed upon. 
Royalties are payable at a rate of 3% of the sales value of minerals. The rate 
will increase to 5 %, if the ratio of the total annual production costs 
including operating costs, interests, amortization, depreciation and the three 
percent royalty to the annual sales value is less than 85%. By this device, 
Guyana increases early cash-flow for the company and will obtain the higher 
royalty only at a later stage, when market conditions and operating costs 
allow it. COGEMA will pay income and corporation tax at a rate of 45% and 
obtains accelerated depreciation/amortization( 5 x 2o%), exemption from 
customs duties and a 7-years loss carry forward. The prospective joint company 
will be entitled to an exploration allowance for future exploration outside 
the mining area up to lo% of total capital expenditure in the first five 
years, and 5% thereafter. A '"special mining royalty" is established which 
basically triggers an additional tax at a rate of 25% on income exceeding an 
internal rate of return on total investment of lo% plus either, at the 
company's option, the US inflation rate or the US domestic corporate borrowing 
( 3 8 8 6 N ) 
- 38 -
rate. Other methods bf government revenue-sharing consist in a 15% withholding 
tax on dividends and the government's free 25% equity. 
Foreign exchange rights are established to meet foreign exchange obligations 
and to pay amounts due to COGEMA; these rights are guaranteed by the Bank of 
Guyana. 
E) Legal Status 
In all three cases, the legal status of a contract between the government and 
a foreign company is difficult to ascertain, ás South American countries ( in 
particular Latin American countries) have always emphasized the Calvo doctrine 
fully subjecting such agreements to national law and jurisdiction. Investors, 
on the other hand, have tried to secure some protection from subsequent 
government interference by having access to international law and arbitral 
tr ibunals. 
The Chile/St.Joe contracts provide several times for a stabilization 
("freezing") of the law valid at the time of conclusion of the contract for 
the duration of the agreement. However, surprising given the investment 
promotion philosophy of Chile at that time, the agreement follows the 
Calvo-principles and omits any reference to international arbitration(e.g. 
ICSID, ICC or external ad-hoc arbitration, e.g. with UNCITRAL rules). 
The Colombia/Exxon contract is exclusively subject to Colombian law and to the 
jurisdiction of Colombian courts; INTERCOR waives, consistent with the 
Calvo-doctrine, diplomatic protection except in the case of a narrowly defined 
denial of justice. Colombia follows thereby closely and successfully the 
Calvo-principles which have often been denounced by foreign companies as in-
imical to investment security. However, their impact in Colombia may be 
lessened and their acceptability by EXXON may be increased by the fact that 
Colombia has enjoyed an unusual legalistic tradition and independence of the 
judiciary which may make the unilateral change of contractual terms by way of 
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legislative action less likely than in other countries. 
While the agreement does not provide for international arbitration on in-
vestment disputes, as generally preferred by foreign investors, it contains a 
special procedure for "technical disputes": They are to be submitted to a 
three-experts-panel the chairman will be, if both parties can not agree, ap-
pointed by the Managing Board of the Colombian Association of Engineers, in 
the case of accounting disputes by the Central Board of the Bogota 
Accountants. If the qualification of a dispute as legal or technical is con-
troversial, Colombian courts will decide. Non-technical disputes are 
exclusively within the jurisdiction of Colombian courts. 
The concern of the Investor for stability of essential terms of the agreement 
are evidenced by several clauses: Art. 16.4 seeks to stabilize the impact of 
future changes of the general income tax law in Colombia: While, true to the 
nature of the agreement creating a legal obligation only between INTERCOR and 
CARBOCOL, but not with the Colombian government as such, the article does not 
attempt to "freeze" the tax legislation applicable in 1976, but rather 
provides that the financial impact of a change of general income tax rules on 
INTERCOR will be off-set by a cor- responding modification of the 
"participation revenue" due to CARBOCOL. In other words, CARBOCOL will have to 
reduce its claims against INTERCOR, if INTERCOR is taxed by the Colombian 
state more heavily than assumed in 1976. This method of stabilizing the fiscal 
regime is less questionable as tra- ditional "freezing clauses" which were 
open to attack on the ground that a sovereign state can not tie its hands by 
contract with a private enterprise. However, the clause does not cover all 
contingencies: For example, one could envisage an increase or imposition of 
taxes on mineral production that exceed the amount payable under the 
participation mechanism. In that case, INTERCOR would be hatd put to claim 
compensation from CARBOCOL. 
Art. 39 declares the foreign exchange regime determined by the National 
Council of Economic and Social Policy(Cf. supra) one of the "basic conditions" 
for the contract and the agreement incorporates the full text of the pertinent 
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decision. The agreement does not provide for a procedure or sanction if that 
foreign exchange regime is modified. Presumably, INTERCOR would be entitled to 
claim breach of contract, terminate the agreement and ask for compensation. 
The 1982 Guyana/Cogema uranium agreement also witnesses the difficult methods 
of accomodating national sovereignty versus investment stability concerns. 
Apart from a procedure of expert determination in case of pricing disputes for 
uranium exports, disputes will be subject to a conciliation procedure between 
the Minister and the Chief Executive of COGEMA. Otherwiser the Chief Executive 
of the Inter-American Development Bank may appoint a conciliator who can make 
a non-binding recommendation. Otherwise, there will be dispute settlement by 
arbitration on the basis of the UNCITRAL arbitration rules. The appointing 
authority will be the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat or, 
the Secretary General of the International Court of Justice(presumedly, the 
wording in the agreement is obsolete). Other technical disputes will be 
determined by experts using the ICSID's rules on fact-finding , to be 
appointed by the appointing authority for arbitration(cf. supra). 
The agreement is declared to be governed by the law of Guyana; however, the 
terms of the agreement are stipulated to prevail over general law. Tax rules 
applicable during the time of the conclusion of the contract are frozen for 
the duration of the contract. 
F) Conclusions 
The three agreements analysed in more detail with respect to form of contract, 
management and control, financial regime and legal status of the contract 
illustrate the new mechanisms of contractual accomodation between governments 
and investors in the wake of the wave of foreign investment restriction and 
nationalizations of the early 1970ies. In all three cases, the economic 
nationalism is clearly present and the governments take pains , in differing 
degrees, to uphold national sovereignty; on the other hand, the governments 
equally take pains to accomodate concerns of the investor and financiers 
considered reasonable, legitimate and required by the specific nature of the 
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project» The specific situation of each country is strongly presents While 
Chile grants guarantees on all questions where previous mining investors have 
been severely affected by previous government actions, Colombia's relatively 
reduced indebtedness in 1976 made it more ready to assume 5o% of the financing 
burden of- the project» On the other hand; political sensitivites seem to have 
made the Colosabian government shun full legal association with the foreign 
partner in the form of a joint venture company» Guyana's strong interest in 
obtaining uranium exploration in areas disputed with Venezuela made it willing 
to grant a large exclusive exploration right, while on the other hand the 
contract strongly emphasizes the importance of Guyana having a strong visible 
representation in any future uranium company emerging. Also, Guyana's foreign 
exchange problems are reflected in its unwillingness to expose itself to 
foreign exchange debt, while emphasizing financial revenues, though in a very 
flexible form responsive to investor needs for heavy initial cash flow. In 
toto, the thre© contracts illustrate that the developments of the 1970ies may 
have mad® it more challenging to achieve sophisticated mineral agreements, but 
that on th© other hand there is„ provided both sides share an interest in 
investment,, ample room for developing-stable^-but flexible contractual 
mechanisms that might be able to accomodate the main concerns of both partners 
even in view of changes in the economic environment for quite some time. 
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